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 Abstract 
Climate change is an urgent problem. Due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 
the average planet is warming at an alarming rate, causing large-scale changes to ecosystems 
humans depend on. Additionally, since what we emit today get locked into the Earth’s 
atmosphere for hundreds of years, time is of the essence. The problem's size requires policy 
intervention at scale, and there is an opportunity cost of delayed policy action. Forgoing an 
incremental policy in order to pursue sweeping, but delayed, policy may hinder the ability to stay 
below the 1.5 degrees C threshold identified by the IPCC. Climate change policy in the U.S. has 
been particularly challenging to pass. Because of the critical time aspect of this issue, it is 
important to understand why this is and what factors impact political feasibility, or the ability of 
a bill or measure to be passed, in hopes of informing policy advocates of what legislation or 
actions to target going forward. This research looks at data models of past ballot initiatives at the 
State level and Federal climate legislation to quantify relationships between measurable and 
political feasibility factors. The model identified a significant negative relationship between 
percent voted yes and campaign finance spent in opposition and a significant positive 
relationship between percent voted yes and percent Hispanic at the State ballot box. However, in 
general, results were not conclusive on many of the factors being tested, signaling that more 
research and data is needed on what causes voters to vote in a certain way on climate- and 
energy-related measures. At the Federal level, campaign donations and partisan identity were 
strong, significant predictors. This re-emphasizes the need to depolarize the issue by reaching 
across the aisle to find common ground and a potential need for campaign finance reform, such 
as a ban on donations above 4% of total fundraising from a given sector (in this case, the energy 
and natural resources sector).  
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Executive Summary 
The EPC program has helped me develop a broader understanding of the intersection of 
science, technology, and policy on the issue of climate change. From a scientific perspective, 
having a strong scientific foundation on earth and ocean dynamics, captures the magnitude, 
gravity, and complexity of the problem. This program has helped me identify the causes and 
effects of a changing climate, backed with strong scientific evidence. It is from this foundation 
that technological and policy solutions need to be approached and supported. From a 
technological perspective, addressing the scale of the problem will require research, 
development, and deployment of new and emerging technologies. Economies will need to be 
transformed by these technologies in order to decarbonize and avoid the worst effects of climate 
change. Transformational change however will not happen on its own – it needs strong policy 
support. At this point in time, a decarbonized economy is more expensive and would result in a 
many “losers”, willing to spend a lot of money to avoid acknowledgment of climate change and 
misinform the public in order to protect their business. The policy pillar is integral in increasing 
the adoption of new technologies, achieving economies of scale, and correcting market 
inefficiencies born from the negative externality (social cost) of carbon. It is from these 
foundational pillars that I embarked on this Capstone Project. This research acknowledges the 
importance of policy in driving our ability to stay below the scientifically backed 1.5 degree C 
threshold. By attempting to quantify and measure the political feasibility of a climate or energy-
related policy, I search for insight into how the U.S. could change course to improve the 
likelihood that meaningful legislation gets passed. Science tells us that timing is critical and we 
need new technological solutions; policy should be crafted to support these realities, but also in a 
 
 
 2 
way that can garner widespread public and congressional support so that we can start relieving 
pressure on our limited carbon budget. 
Introduction 
Climate change, the increase in global average temperature due to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, can be described as an urgent humanitarian crisis. Even small changes 
in temperature can have devastating effects on natural ecosystems and weather patterns, affecting 
the systems that humans depend on. Moreover, the faster the climate changes, the harder it will 
be to adapt to those changes. Since the pre-industrial period, anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions have already contributed to about 1 degree C increase in global temperature. At our 
current rate, we could be passing the critical 1.5 degrees C threshold established by the IPCC 
likely between 2030 and 2050 (Buis 2019). Additionally, infrastructure investments in energy 
and transportation systems lock-in outcomes for significant periods of time, since these kinds of 
projects last for decades, which can lead to lag times in the effects of new policy (Gilligan 2014). 
It is under this context that time is of the essence. Gilligan (2014) highlights the importance of 
political feasibility in climate change instrument choice because the timing of policy 
implementation to tackle climate change is so important, where delaying adoption of a sub-
optimal policy may be at the expense of attempting to pass the optimal policy to no avail. 
In order to address the challenge of climate change, humans need to quickly move 
towards a more sustainable and carbon-free economy in a short period of time. More specifically, 
to limit the world to warming of only 1.5 degrees C, the IPPC report estimates that CO2 
emissions would need to be cut in half from 2010 levels by 2030, with the target of net zero by 
2050 (IPCC 2018). 2030 is less than 10 years out, and the US has yet to enact meaningful 
climate and energy-related policy at scale to address the scale of the problem. There is an 
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opportunity cost of unrealized emissions reduction from policies that may not meet the scale of 
the problem but could have made progress in the interim. Why has progress on this issue been so 
difficult? 
There are many potential answers to that question. This work aims to explore factors 
impacting the political feasibility of climate- and energy-related policy to provide more insight 
into why some policies pass and others fail. The likelihood of a policy getting passed can be 
termed as “political feasibility”. Research shows political feasibility to be context dependent and 
contingent on probabilistic constraints – such as resource shortages, opposing interest groups, or 
technology availability – and the assessment of political feasibility may therefore depend on 
which constraints fall within the realm of the policy maker’s influence or control (Jewell and 
Cherp 2019; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012). Context dependence also implies that a policy 
that may have failed in the past can still be politically feasible in the future. On climate change, 
decreasing costs of decarbonization and increasing the capacity of relevant actors within the 
space can lead to greater political feasibility of supportive climate policies (Jewell and Cherp 
2019). To understand what other attributes may contribute to political feasibility of a climate or 
energy related policy, I will study two research questions: 
RS1: What factors are most likely to impact the probability that a climate change or 
energy related policy is passed at the ballot box? 
RS2: What factors are most likely to impact the likelihood that a member of Congress 
votes yes on climate change or energy related policy?  
I hypothesize that right-leaning political party affiliation - of a voting population or a 
Congress member - more money spent on lobbying efforts against, and the longer ago it was 
proposed all significantly decrease the probability that an energy or climate-related measure or 
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bill is passed. As demonstrated from research, climate change has become a politically polarized 
issue, where those on the right side of the political spectrum are less likely to prioritize the issue 
or even think that it is happening (Leiserowitz et al., 2019); therefore, I expect to also see this 
association in the voting records. Additionally, research shows that climate change has become 
more visible in the media over the years, as shown in Figure 1 below (Boykoff et al. 2020). 
 
Figure 1: 2000 – 2020 U.S. Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change or Global Warming 
Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) show that media coverage has a significant 
impact on public concern over climate change, and so in correlation with the rise in media 
coverage, it has risen as a priority in public sentiment since 2008, particularly among democrats 
(PRC 2020). However, it is also important to consider how prioritization of climate change has 
changed during economic downturns. In the US, recent evidence shows that just before COVID 
hit, environmental concerns rivaled economic concerns as a top political priority for the first time 
in nearly two decades of data collection (PRC 2020). However, the same data also demonstrates 
the issue remains highly polarized between political factions. Interestingly, since COVID, 
multiple studies have found that the current economic downturn has not impacted levels of 
concern regarding climate change, demonstrating levels at or near historic records (Tyson and 
Kennedy 2020; Leiserowitz et al. 2020). This differs from the Great Recession, where research 
showed a strong and robust relationship between environmental protection prioritization 
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decreasing as unemployment levels increased (Kenny 2019). To control for and test this theory, 
the modeling done at the state level in this study will include a measure on the public perception 
of climate change, as estimated by the percent of people in the state that believe climate change 
is happening and is caused by humans (Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2020), and the annual 
unemployment rate. After controlling for these measures, I expect to see a relationship between 
the year of the bill and its probability of passing, with later years having higher probability. 
I also hypothesize that these relationships will be stronger in Federal legislature than at 
the ballot box because, at the ballot box, I am assuming these measures are generally one of 
many, the voter is anonymous, and the average voter is not very well informed, whereas a vote 
on the Congress floor has higher visibility, and the person voting has a reputation they have to 
uphold to please constituents and/or donors. Furthermore, it is precisely because the average 
voter is not very well informed that I believe the voter is more susceptible to certain persuasion 
campaigns' prominence. Lastly, I am interested in seeing in RS1 whether the model identifies the 
kinds of policies that have a higher likelihood of passing (based on categorical variables) and if 
there is a significant relationship between the perceived climate impact or costs of the policy the 
probability of it passing. 
Current knowledge in the field has found mixed evidence regarding how campaign 
finance impacts policy outcomes (Powell 2012). Researchers have found that campaign finance's 
influence may depend on the policy issue – specifically how visible and understood the issue is 
by the public – and how indebted legislators are to their donors (Craig and Madland 2014; 
Powell 2012). However, numerous studies demonstrate that businesses with the most to gain or 
lose are also the most likely to engage in political activity. These business interest groups are 
often successful in shaping policy outcomes (Craig and Madland 2014). This is of particular 
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concern for the issue of climate change, as there are powerful business interests who stand to 
lose a lot if significant climate change policy is enacted. Cragg and Kahn (2009) have also 
shown partisanship to be a key factor that influences legislative decision-making processes when 
it comes to the issue of climate change. Counties with higher per-capita carbon emissions, which 
are also more likely to be poorer, are more likely to be represented by Republicans. Therefore, it 
may be theorized that Republicans are more likely to vote against climate legislation because of 
the financial burden or economic harm it would bring to the area; however, the evidence shows 
that even while holding district per-capita carbon and income constant, Republicans are more 
likely to vote against climate legislation (Cragg and Kahn, 2009). Additionally, it is important to 
note that this study assumes substituting away from carbon is more costly. However, as 
technology advances, the cost of carbon-free technology has and will continue to decrease – in 
many cases, building new renewable generation is less expensive than operating existing coal 
plants (IRENA 2020). In order to reach economies of scale where these cost reductions can 
occur, higher levels of deployment are needed; this can often be supported through policy 
initiatives.  
  Though review of history may not be a leading indicator of what is to come, this research 
seeks to expose important relationships and trends that can help inform what factors influence 
the probability of a policy passing and under what circumstances on the issue of climate change 
in the near-term, and to consider the political opportunity cost of delayed action so that progress 
can be made. 
Methods 
Data 
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For RS1, the data collection process encompassed deciding which ballot measures to 
include, and then for each ballot measure, collecting the following information: state, year, 
topical tags, percent of vote, financial impact, ballots cast, and campaign finance information. 
Then for each state, in order to establish a relationship between the voting population and the 
ballot results, data was collected on: voting age population, partisanship of state legislature, latest 
state budget, average age, percent male, percent white, percent Hispanic, public perception on 
climate change, and unemployment rate. The source of each variable is demonstrated in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1: Data Sources. 
 
The following steps were taken to curate a data set of relevant state ballot measures 
related to energy and climate. First, I retrieved a list of all potentially relevant ballot measures 
via the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) database. The search filtered from 
years 2008 to 2019 and the topics of energy, electricity, transportation, and agriculture, but 
included all states, measures, and election types. For measures that were only tagged as 
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transportation, it was excluded unless the measure's sole focus was mass transit or a fuel tax. For 
measures that were only tagged as agriculture, the measure was excluded unless it specified 
sustainable farming or conservation practices. Second, I used research from the Energy 
Innovation Policy Simulator on the effectiveness of different types of energy and climate-related 
policies to determine a climate impact score between 0 to 4 based on a policy category, as 
demonstrated in the table below. Each ballot measure was mapped to a category here and 
assigned this score for climate impact. The climate impact variable is designed to convert context 
dependent information of the measure to a numeric scale. If a ballot measure worked negatively 
against climate impact in one of these categories, I took the inverse of the percent yes, and 
flipped the campaign finance money for and against, such that all ballots were framed as a vote 
yes is a vote associated with positive climate impact. 
Table 2: Policy categories and associated climate impact score assignments 
 
A similar conversion took place related to interpreting the financial analysis and impact 
information of the measure and producing a cost scale, shown below.  
 
 
 9 
Table 3: Rules for Cost Scale Assignment 
 
This data collection process resulted in 69 state ballots to be included in a linear regression 
model. For 11 of the 69 cases, small adjustments were made to the generic category to climate 
impact score mapping using justification based on the details of the measure, as demonstrated in 
Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Context-based adjustments to climate impact score and justification 
 
For RS2, this research looked at three major federal climate legislation proposals: The 
Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, The Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, and 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Upon research, these bills are recognized 
as the most prominent climate legislation that saw a vote on the Congress floor in the last 20 
 
 
 10 
years. The first two bills were voted on in the Senate, and the third was voted on in the House. 
Voting records for each of these bills were pulled from either govtrack.us or congress.gov/roll-
call-votes. These records provided the result of how each individual congress member voted on 
particular legislature, including his or her party and state affiliation. For the campaign finance 
cycle that included the year of the vote, OpenSecrets.org provided information on total campaign 
finance raised by “Campaign Committee & Leadership PAC Combined” for the individual in the 
industries of mining, electric utilities, oil and gas, and chemical manufacturing, as well as the 
total from the energy and natural resources sector for each Congress member. Supplemental data 
for this model included emissions per capita by state, as provided by U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, and the composition of the state legislature, as provided by Ballotpedia. In the 
RS2 data collection process, I randomly sampled 30 Senate members from the first two voting 
records and 50 House members from the third voting record by assigning a number to each voter 
and then using a random sample generator to select the study participants. 
Analysis 
For RS1, I modeled an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression on the percentage of 
voters that voted yes on the measure. Although a linear regression model is able predict values 
that aren’t possible, i.e. values below 0 or above 1, and the relationship is actually sigmoidal 
(between 0 and 1), this isn’t a large concern because the majority of the data fell within 0.3 and 
0.7, which is the linear part of the sigmoidal curve. I ran three versions of the model to test 
different theories of the environment: 
1) Ballot measure attributes only – ballot measure attributes drive the ability to predict the 
outcome. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 =  𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏3𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑏𝑏6𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏8𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝑏𝑏9𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
2) State attributes only – attributes of the voting population drive the ability to predict the 
outcome. 
𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 =  𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏8𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
3) Combined ballot and state attributes – the combination of both ballot measure attributes 
and voting population characteristics drives the ability to accurately predict a measure 
outcome. 
𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 =  𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏8𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏9𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏10𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏11𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏12𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏13𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏14𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 𝑏𝑏15𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏16𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
In order to select the appropriate features, I started with all relevant variables included in the 
model and then dropped variables one by one without significance or that do not improve the 
fitness (explanatory power) of the model, as measured by R-squared. R-squared varies between 0 
and 1, with higher values indicating stronger model fit. I also used the root mean squared error 
(RMSE), an indicator of the standard deviation in Y's variability not explained in the model, to 
compare model fit across models. A lower RMSE value indicates better fit. 
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For RS2, I tested a logistic regression on whether or not a member of Congress voted for 
or against the proposed policy. Similarly, I started with all variables of interest included in the 
model and then filtered down to only include the statistically significant variables, or that were 
important to address my hypothesis. 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏  
𝑝𝑝
1 − 𝑝𝑝
= 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑋𝑋𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑏5𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  
The factors that are most likely to impact the probability of a policy passing or the likelihood of a 
Congress member voting yes are determined based on the size and significance of variables 
modeled. A variable is considered significant if it has a p-value less than 0.05, meaning there 
would be less than a 5% we would see this result if the null hypothesis – that the coefficient is 
equal to 0 – were true.  
Exploratory 
RS1 State Ballot Measures 
California is the most represented state in this sample with 13 ballot measures, followed 
by the state of Washington with 9 ballot measures, compared to the sample median of 2 ballot 
measures per state. The chart below demonstrates the proportion of climate- and energy-related 
ballot measures that passed (Vote Yes) by state, though it does not provide any insight into the 
type of ballot measure that was considered. 
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Figure 2: Measures Included by State 
The most common categorical assignment was “Conservation”. “Conservation”, “Invest in 
personal vehicle alternatives”, and “Climate Adaptation” had the highest proportion measures 
passed at 95%, 100%, and 100% respectively. “Tax on fossil fuels” and “Vehicle/gas tax” had 
the lowest proportion measures passed at only 20% and 25% respectively. 
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Figure 3: Measures Included by Policy-Assigned Impact Category 
If we look at the percent of climate- and energy-related ballot measures that passed by Year and 
by Climate Impact Scale, there are no clear trends in increasing likelihood over time or deceasing 
likelihood with higher impact. 
 
RS2 Federal Legislation 
The series of bar charts below demonstrate clear differences in voting records by each 
categorical variable. These charts suggest that a Republican is more likely to vote no; a Congress 
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member in a State with a Republican governor is more likely to vote no; a Male is more likely to 
vote no; a vote in later years is more likely to be yes; and a member with longer tenure (over 9 
years) is more likely to vote yes. 
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Results  
RS1: What factors are most likely to impact the probability that a climate change or energy 
related policy is passed at the ballot box? 
The table below summarizes a comparison of the three models run for RS1. Following 
are the detailed analysis results by model. 
Table 5: RS1 Summary Table 
 
Model (1) Ballot attributes only 
Table 6: OLS Regression - Ballot-attributes 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probability from Regression Results Against Actuals – Ballot-attributes 
 
 
 17 
This regression model tested a theory that only what is in the ballot measure itself affects what 
the proportion voted Yes would be. This model's R-squared is 0.394, signifying that 39.4% of the 
variation in the proportion voted Yes on a measure is explained by X here. The root mean 
squared error (RMSE) is 0.111, which is interpreted as this model resulting in a 11.1% standard 
deviation of the unexplained variance in the proportion voted Yes. Lastly, when plotting the 
actual Y values against the predicted Y values, as shown in Figure 4, the model results are not 
particularly linear, which indicates this may not be the right model fit, or that the model is 
missing key variables to control for differences in the variation of Y.  
Following the criteria that a coefficient is a significant predictor if the p-value is less than 
0.05, the significant predictors in this model are campaign finance money spent against, whether 
the measure is transportation-related, and whether the measure is energy- and electric-utilities-
related. Based on this model, if there is no campaign finance money spent for or against, no 
climate impact, ambiguous costs, and no topical indicators, the average proportion voted Yes on 
a measure is predicted to be 69.9%. Holding all else constant: a $1,000,000 increase in campaign 
finance spent against a measure decreases the predicted proportion voted Yes by 0.53%; a topical 
tag of transportation decreases the predicted proportion voted Yes by 15.3%; and a topical tag of 
energy and electric utilities decreases the predicted proportion voted Yes by 7.4%. 
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Model (2) State attributes only 
Table 7: OLS Regression - State-attributes 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted Probability from Regression Results Against Actuals - State-attributes 
This regression model tested a theory that it is only the attributes of the voting population on the 
ballot measure that affects what the proportion voted Yes would be. R-squared of this model is 
0.269, signifying that only 26.9% of the variation in the proportion voted Yes on a measure is 
explained by X here. The root mean squared error (RMSE) is 0.121, which is interpreted as this 
model resulting in a 12.1% standard deviation of the unexplained variance in the proportion 
voted Yes. The lower R-squared and higher RMSE here signify a worse fit than model (1). In 
this case, when plotting the actual Y values against the predicted Y values in Figure 5, the model 
results are more linear than model (1), but the high residual values still indicate this may not be 
the right model fit, or that the model is missing key variables to control for differences in the 
variation of Y.  
 
 
 19 
Following the criteria that a coefficient is a significant predictor if the p-value is less than 
0.05, the only significant predictors in the model are the percent male of the voting population 
and public perception. Based on this model, if each variable is assigned the mean value of that 
predictor, the average proportion voted Yes on a measure is predicted to be 56.2%. Holding all 
else constant, as the percent male increases by 1%, the predicted outcome decreases by 4.5%; as 
the percent of population that believes climate change is happening and is human-caused 
increases by 1%, the predicted outcome decreases by 1.3%. 
Model (3) Combined 
When I combined controlling for state level attributes with measuring the ballot 
measure's attributes, the model performed much better at predicting the outcome. Here, I started 
with all variables from models (1) and (2), and then removed one non-significant predictor at a 
time and addressed the impact on R-squared – if R-squared dropped by more than 0.01, I kept 
the variable in the model, otherwise, it was dropped. Additionally, I removed the variable public 
perception because it had a fairly high correlation (r=0.6) with two of the other predictors 
(percent Hispanic and state legislation percent Republican). This resulted in a high R-squared 
model (r=0.547) and low root mean squared error (RMSE=0.096). These two metrics signified a 
better fitting model than both the ballot-attributes theory and the state-attributes theory. 
However, the results indicated potential multicollinearity in the model. This interferes with our 
ability to interpret the coefficients of the model because it means one of the predictors can be 
explained by the other predictors, and so if one of the predictors moves, the others move too. 
Therefore, we are not able to isolate the effect of each variable on its own. In order to address 
this, I looked at Variable Inflation Factors (VIF), which measures for each variable, how well it 
is described by the other independent variables. A VIF exceeding 10 indicates high 
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multicollinearity, and so I dropped variables with a VIF above 10 until I was left with only 
independent variables that have a VIF below 10. Beginning with these variables, I remodeled the 
regression. 
Table 8: OLS Regression Results - Combined 
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted Probability from Regression Results Against Actuals - Combined 
The model resulted in a R-squared of 0.47 and RMSE of 0.103, which reflects slightly 
worse explanatory power, but higher interpretability of significant variables. Notably, the percent 
male had a high VIF; even though this variable contributed significantly to the model's 
explanatory power, it impacted interpretability and was therefore excluded from this version of 
the model. In this version, when plotting the actual Y values against the predicted Y values, the 
model results are more linear than both model (1) and (2), with smaller residual values, which 
can be observed as the points are closer to the line in Figure 6; however, there appears to be a 
slight skew in that the model systematically appears to under predict the percent outcome for 
measures resulting in over 65% voted Yes.  
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Multiple predictors in this model pass the criterion for significance. Of note is that the 
climate impact scale, cost scale, percent of the legislature that is republican and the 
unemployment rate are all not significant predictors at the 0.05 significance level. Predictors that 
were significant in the model include campaign finance money spent against, topical tags of 
transportation and energy and electric utilities, and percent Hispanic. Holding all else constant, a 
$1,000,000 increase in campaign finance spent against a measure decreases the predicted 
proportion voted Yes by 0.55%. Additionally, a topical tag of transportation, energy and electric 
utilities, environmental protection, and agricultures decreases the predicted proportion voted Yes 
by 15.4%, 7.1%, 7.0%, and 6.0% respectively, signaling that a transportation measure is least 
likely to pass, followed by energy and electric utilities and environmental protection, and then 
agricultural, which is the topic most likely to pass; however, the agriculture tag is also not 
significant, likely due to the fact that there was not a large enough sample of agricultural 
measures within the sample to determine its effect. Lastly, holding all else constant, a 1% 
increase in the percent Hispanic of the population increases the predicted proportion voted Yes 
by 0.27%.  
RS2: What factors are most likely to impact the likelihood that a member of Congress votes yes 
on climate change or energy related policy?  
Table 9: Logistic Regression 
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Table 10: Log Odds of Coefficients 
 
The variables for republican governor, percent state legislature that is republican, and state 
emissions per capita all do not improve model accuracy, precision, or recall and are not 
significant, and therefore are dropped from the model. The remaining independent variables 
result in a model with an accuracy, precision, and recall all around 90%. Figure 6 below 
demonstrates the Confusion Matrix (left) and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of 
the model (right), respectively. The Confusion Matrix demonstrates the number of predicted true 
positives (top left), true negatives (bottom right), false positives (bottom left), and false negatives 
(top right). The ROC curve plots the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) 
– here the curve is close to the top-left corner, which indicates good performance.  
 
 
Figure 7: Indicators of Model Performance 
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If we plug in the mean values of all variables into the model, it would result in a 33% probability 
that a Congress member votes Yes. Holding all else equal, the odds of voting Yes is 94% lower 
for Republican Congress members than Democrat or Independent counterparts. The box plot 
below demonstrates the clear divergence in the distribution of the predicted probability based on 
whether or not the study participant is a Republican. 
 
The odds of voting Yes is 33% higher for each year out from 2003. The box plot below shows 
that the mean and distribution of the probability for voting Yes shifts higher as the years out 
increases. 
 
The odds of voting Yes are more than 99.99% lower for every 1% increase in the proportion of 
funding that comes from the energy and natural resources sector. Based on the graph below, 
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there appears to be an exponential decline in the probability of voting Yes as the proportion of 
campaign finance from the energy and natural resources sector increases. 
  
Lastly, the odds of voting Yes are more than 259% higher for male Congress members; and the 
odds of voting Yes is 9.6% higher for each additional year of tenure the Congress member has. 
Discussion 
Through this research, I cannot identify whether these observed relationships are causal 
because there are likely confounding variables that are not measurable or that I am not able to 
hold constant, as you would in an experimental design with a control and treatment group. I 
address some of these confounding variables in the section below. However, I think modeling 
this data does provide some insight into the strength of relationships and predictability of an 
outcome as attributed to the variability in the explanatory variables measured here. Even without 
the ability to claim causation, these relationships matter because they expose the often-negative 
consequences of money in politics and how partisan ideology can trump content of a bill or 
measure. This highlights the importance of two key aspects that may help the political feasibility 
of energy- and climate-related policy: campaign finance reform and de-polarization of the issue 
by finding bi-partisan grounds. 
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RS1: What factors are most likely to impact the probability that a climate change or energy 
related policy is passed at the ballot box? 
A general assumption I make in this research is that observable and measurable attributes 
affect whether or not a climate or energy policy is "successful", as measured by its probability of 
passing. However, most aspects of political feasibility may be related to what goes on behind 
closed doors and what the negotiations look like, which are more difficult to measure and not 
included in my research. For example, it is often said in policy that “the devil is in the details”. 
Though I have tried to capture qualitative attributes as quantitatively measured variables in my 
models, I have not been able to capture all the details that may impact how much impact a policy 
could have on energy and climate, and what other parties may be affected by the measure based 
on the details of measure. I believe this is part of the reason why the variable to measure climate 
impact scale was not a significant predictor. Even if the measure may have addressed aspects of 
energy and the environment that would impact climate, based on the level of detail I observed for 
each bill, which is likely more than the detail an average voter would have, it is very difficult to 
conclusively perceive what impact the policy would have. Therefore, the insignificance of the 
predictor simply indicates that there is no clear relationship between climate impact and 
probability of passing likely due to the fact that most citizens are not actively engaged and 
educated on the issue of climate change and the role policy can play. Similarly, as it was difficult 
to create a methodology to standardize the quantification of costs associated with a policy, I 
assume it would also be difficult for voters to assess the voter's financial impact and/or to the 
state budget. It is for this reason that I think the cost scale variable was also insignificant.  
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There was no clear and significant merit order of topical tags to indicate the types of 
policies that have a higher likelihood of passing, besides the finding that transportation-related 
measures had the lowest likelihood of passing. The transportation related measures were most 
often vehicle or gas taxes, which voters often misperceive as having a larger impact than they 
actually have and therefore are more likely to reject (Fisher and Wassmer 2014). This may be 
part of the reason why we observe this outcome. Surprisingly, there was not enough evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that both right-leaning political party affiliation (in the state) and the 
year of the measure coefficients are 0. The lack of clarity in the relationship between Republican 
representation in the state and the probability of passing may be due to differences between the 
bills that get introduced in Republican versus Democratic states. Imagine, Bill A is introduced to 
a Republican state and and Bill B is introduced to a Democratic state and they both have the 
same probability of passing; however, because of nuances in each bill (not captured in the 
model), it is possible that if Bill B were instead introduced in a Republican state, it may have a 
very different outcome. Additionally, because the sample skews towards California and 
Washington propositions, it may be that there was not enough data on Republican-leaning states 
to tease out significance in the model.  
A potential reason for why the year was not proven to be significant is because the 
distribution of states in which energy and climate-related ballot measures get proposed differ 
from year to year. Another theory may be that even though climate change has become a more 
pressing issue over the years, the misinformation campaign around the topic also increased 
substantially, largely funded by fossil fuel companies and the Koch brothers (Leonard 2019). 
The percent Hispanic was the strongest predictor on the state attributes side in predicting 
likelihood of passing, specifically that a higher Hispanic population was correlated with a higher 
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probability of passing. This is in line with past research that has shown that the Hispanic 
population is disproportionately affected by climate change or environmental issues and is more 
likely to say global warming is caused by humans (Krogstad 2015; Latino Decisions 2016). One 
potential action item is to increase the number of registered Hispanics and encourage more of 
their vote in order to help get climate legislation passed. However, one limitation to note is that 
the state attributes looked at the demographics of the voting age population, but not necessarily 
the demographics of the population who actually voted on the measure (due to lack of 
availability on that data). Additionally, California is an over-represented state in this sample and 
is a state with a higher Hispanic population than most other states. 
The campaign finance money spent against was the most significant predictor on the 
ballot attributes side in predicting likelihood of passing. Interestingly, campaign finance money 
spent for was not proven to be significant or to increase the model's explanatory power. 
Replacing the two variables with one variable measuring the spread in campaign finance for and 
against was significant but decreased the explanatory power of the model (R-squared) by more 
than 7% as compared to just using the variable for money spent against. This demonstrates that 
campaign finance is a powerful tool when it comes to voter persuasion in state politics. On 
average, for the votes that passed, $1.8 million more was spent for the bill than against. For the 
votes that didn’t pass, $5.4 million more was spent against the bill than for. This is in line with 
past research and is also a grave concern because those who stand to lose from climate change 
policies have deep pockets. 
Additionally, the inclusion of unemployment rate in the model provided weak evidence 
(p-value = 0.12) for the theory that climate- and energy-related measures get deprioritized (lower 
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likelihood of passing) when the economy is suffering, as measured by a higher unemployment 
rate. 
In all three models, it can be observed that the models are not very good at predicting Y 
values over 65%, though model 3 shows improvements from models 1 and 2. As mentioned in 
the Analysis section, the relationship we are modeling via a linear regression is actually 
sigmoidal, which is not a problem as long as the outcomes mainly fall between the linear portion 
of the sigmoidal curve (0.3 to 0.7). I believe the reason why points over 65% have higher 
residual values are because these points start to approach the non-linear part of the sigmoidal 
curve.  
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that states address climate policies in different 
ways. For example, this study focused only on ballot measures at the state level. So it tended to 
favor the states that are more likely to measure the people on energy and climate, such as 
California. In contrast, other states that are active in policy-making in this area but do not 
approach policy making through the ballot box, such as New York, are underrepresented. 
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that the over-representation of California and Washington 
in this sample – simply due to the fact that this research utilized the entire population of relevant 
ballot measures between 2008 and 2019 and these two states had the highest number of measures 
– means that these results may not be generalized broadly to all States in the US. Future research 
could use stratified sampling techniques by creating two sub-populations of ballot measures, one 
for red-leaning states and one for blue-leaning states, and then taking a random sample from each 
of those two populations to try to create a more representative sample. However, this method 
would likely result in a fairly small sample size from which it could also be difficult to draw 
conclusions. 
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RS2: What factors are most likely to impact the likelihood that a member of Congress votes yes 
on climate change or energy-related policy?  
As hypothesized, party affiliation (-), campaign finance (-), and year of bill (+) were all 
significant predictors in modeling whether or not a Congress member would vote for or against 
climate legislation. Interestingly, party affiliation is not generalized to the partisanship of the 
state – as having a Republican governor or strong Republican state legislature were not 
significant – but only to the partisan identity of the voting member. This provides evidence to the 
theory that an anti-climate attitude tends to be a pillar of the Republican identity across the 
nation. Although there is a 0.4 correlation between being a Republican and the proportion of 
campaign funding that is provided by the energy and natural resources sector, there did not 
appear to be evidence of multicollinearity in the model, signaling that each variable plays an 
important and independent role in likelihood of voting yes. For all Congress members receiving 
more than 5% of campaign funding from this sector, over 87% of Democrats (7/8) voted no, and 
100% of Republicans (21) voted no. Therefore, even though it is more likely for Republicans to 
receive donations from this sector, when Democrats also have this support, it appears to impact 
their vote. It is unclear whether these Congress members voted a certain way because they 
received this funding or received funding because they voted a certain way. Past research has 
found evidence to support the “investment hypothesis”, where oil and gas companies financially 
reward members of Congress for voting a certain way, rather than providing money to these 
legislators so that they vote a certain way (Goldberg et al., 2020).  
The model shows that the probability of voting yes on a bill increased over the years. 
However, this is a tricky variable to interpret because each year represented a different climate 
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bill, and the third year represented a different chamber of Congress. Therefore, it is possible that 
it is not the time aspect that corresponded to a probability higher, but rather the bill's content or 
the chamber of Congress (House versus Senate). To address this in the future, there are a couple 
of things that could be done. First, there is a need to have a much larger sample of bills and 
voting records across the years from both chambers of Congress. However, this is restricted by 
the actual number of energy- and climate-related bills that have existed throughout history and 
have seen votes on the floor. Second, in this model I had the assumption that the three bills were 
of similar scale. If another model were to increase the range and number of bills included, I 
anticipate the need to create a numerical scale to measure the potential impact and costs 
associated with each policy in order to control for more qualitative aspects. 
Lastly, it is interesting that longer tenure in this model corresponds to a higher likelihood 
of voting yes and that males are more likely to vote yes, despite the underlying data showing a 
smaller proportion of males vote yes than females. The three bills modeled here were all from 
over a decade ago, when Congress largely consisted of white males. It will be interesting to see 
as Congress becomes more diverse and brings in fresh perspectives how these relationships may 
change. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, my hypothesis that right-leaning political party affiliation, more money 
spent on lobbying efforts against, and the longer ago it was proposed all significantly decrease 
the probability that an energy or climate-related measure or bill is passed was supported in RS2 
but not RS1.  
The research of the state level ballot data presented challenges in appropriately capturing 
qualitative aspects of the measures in the model. Therefore, the model was not successful in 
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capturing statistically significant evidence to support what types and scale of measures are more 
likely to pass. However, the model did highlight the importance of campaign finance and the role 
of Hispanic representation in the outcome. To further this research, future studies could look at 
using surveying methods to sample the voting population of specific ballot measures to explicitly 
ask voters why they voted a certain way on a particular measure. This survey could include 
questions about the voter’s previous perception and knowledge on energy and climate issues, 
perceived costs, perceived impact, positive or negative reaction to the language, and exposure to 
ads in support or against the proposed measure. This would allow the researcher to measure 
various perceptions against the actual outcomes and ballot attributes. Future research could also 
develop a more standardized methodology for measuring voters’ perception of the impact (both 
cost and scale) of ballot measures to create apples-to-apples comparisons across measures and 
better identify if there is a relationship between that perception and political feasibility exists. 
RS2 modeling largely supported the hypothesis that Republicans are less likely to vote 
yes on climate legislation and the more money that is received from the energy and natural 
resources sector, the higher the likelihood of a vote no. Legislation in later years was also more 
likely to get a yes vote, but there may be confounding variables at play here as identified above. 
Future studies could measure whether past voting records affect future voting records and what 
happens when a seat changes parties. Researching these questions may help us better understand 
the relationship between tenure and voting record. Another study could also look more in depth 
at the campaign finance data corresponding to a larger range of voting records related to energy 
and climate – the use of feature selection for which companies or dollar values influence votes 
more and use of a random forest model classifier could provide meaningful insight into the 
relationship between money in politics and voting outcomes. This kind of influence has been 
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exposed through qualitative evidence as displayed in the novel Kochland (Leonard 2019), but 
data analysis may expose a larger machine of monetary influence in the system preventing 
political feasibility that runs contrary to public opinions. 
The results from this research largely supports past findings. More research, as suggested 
above, needs to be conducted at the state level to determine the factors that most impact political 
feasibility at the ballot box. At the Federal level, in order to maximize the probability that a piece 
of climate legislation gets passed, action should be taken to expose and remove the influence of 
campaign finance, or the ability of campaign finance to influence results, by setting caps on 
single donors or donations from a single industry, as well as by reaching across the aisle and 
finding common ground with Republican allies that will support some form of climate and 
energy policies. 
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